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HONEST  COPYING  PRACTICES
Joseph P. Fishman*
One of intellectual property theory’s operating assumptions is that creating is hard while
copying is easy.  But it is not always so.  Copies, though outwardly identical, can come from
different processes, from cheap digital duplication to laborious handmade re-creation.  Policymak-
ers around the world face a choice whether such distinctions should affect liability.  The two
branches of intellectual property that condition liability on actual copying, copyright and trade
secrecy, give different answers.  Both in the United States and elsewhere, trade secrecy regimes
distinguish between copying methods deemed illegitimate and those deemed legitimate, what inter-
national treaties call “honest commercial practices.”  Copyright regimes, by contrast, are largely
indifferent.  They focus on the end product, not the process of its production.
Trade secrecy and copyright are not often seen as a natural pair, but on the question of how
copies are made, the former has much to offer the latter.  This Article examines how a defendant’s
method of copying could function as a policy lever within international copyright law.  Because
differences in method can matter to copyright policy’s intended beneficiaries—owners, readers,
and follow-on authors—it should also matter to copyright policy’s crafters.  Yet before that goal
can be implemented, there seems to be a stumbling block.  International treaty commitments
require member states to provide owners an exclusive reproduction right that covers copying per-
formed in any manner.  Nevertheless, that commitment has not stopped states from treating labo-
rious copying differently than cheap copying in limited contexts, such as private uses.  The
problem is that the normative rationale underlying these limited exceptions remains understudied
and therefore unsystematically implemented.  A closer inspection reveals that the same flexibilities
in international law that have allowed states to make these exceptions also allow them to consider
the defendant’s method of copying as a structural element of the reproduction right itself.  The
resulting regime would look something like trade secrecy’s tolerance for honest commercial prac-
tices—what I dub here “honest copying practices.”
INTRODUCTION
One of intellectual property theory’s operating assumptions is that creat-
ing is hard while copying is easy.  But it’s not always so.  Say you would like to
reproduce a drawing.  You might photocopy it in a matter of seconds or
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instead recreate it by hand in a matter of days.  Or perhaps you would like a
copy of your favorite photograph.  You could copy and paste a digital file on
a computer or instead stage the entire subject matter anew in front of a cam-
era.  Copies, though outwardly identical, can come from different processes.
Policymakers around the world face a choice whether such distinctions
should affect a copyist’s liability.  The two branches of intellectual property
that condition liability on copying, trade secrecy and copyright, take different
views.1  Both in the United States and elsewhere, trade secrecy regimes distin-
guish between copying methods deemed illegitimate and those deemed legit-
imate.  Appropriation is only actionable if it is done through means that the
law deems, in the language of international treaties, “contrary to honest com-
mercial practices.”2  Copyright regimes, by contrast, are largely indifferent.
They focus on the end product, not the process of its production.
Trade secrecy and copyright aren’t often seen as a natural pair, but on
this issue—whether the law should care how copies are made—the former
has much to offer the latter.  I have argued elsewhere that an ideal copyright
infringement standard would focus not just on a defendant’s end product
but also, as trade secrecy does, on its process.3  The gist of that argument is
that differences in process matter to several traditional constituencies of cop-
yright policy.  For rights-holders, costly imitation poses less risk of market
usurpation than cheap imitation.  For consumers, a work remade from
scratch may satisfy a different demand than would a digital duplication.  For
authors, deliberately tracing an expert’s creative steps can teach technical
skills that automated processes cannot.  Because the question of how copies
are made can matter to copyright policy’s intended beneficiaries, it should
also matter to copyright policy’s crafters.
Before copyright infringement standards can become sensitive to pro-
cess, however, a significant practical issue is whether such sensitivity would be
feasible under existing international law.  Those already familiar with this
1 Patent law, by contrast, extends liability even to those who independently invent
what happens to be covered by an existing patent. See, e.g., Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell
Indus., 299 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[C]opying . . . is of no import on the ques-
tion of whether the claims of an issued patent are infringed.”).  Whether that extension is
justified has prompted considerable debate elsewhere. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, A Few
Kind Words for Absolute Infringement Liability in Patent Law, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (2016);
Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV.
475 (2006).  I do not take a position here on that question, focusing instead on the forms
of IP infringement that require copying under existing law.
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods art. 39(2), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement];
see also Michael Risch, Trade Secret Law and Information Development Incentives, in THE LAW
AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 152, 166
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011) (“Unlike all other forms of
intellectual property, the trade secret right to exclude applies only when information is
obtained by improper means . . . .”).
3 See Joseph P. Fishman, The Copy Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 855 (2016).
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area might suppose that it forecloses the possibility entirely.  The Berne Con-
vention—the foundational multilateral treaty governing copyright law—guar-
antees owners a broad and seemingly process-agnostic right of “authorizing
the reproduction of . . . [protected] works, in any manner or form.”4  Chang-
ing the treaty requirements, which bind the United States along with 168
other nations, is not a particularly realistic option.  Because any such changes
would require unanimous support of member states, any proposed revision is
commonly dismissed as a political nonstarter.5
Yet despite Berne’s seemingly strict provision, a closer inspection of
existing state practices reveals potential for greater flexibility.  The inclina-
tion to treat laborious copying differently than cheap, digital copying is
already reflected in scattered pockets of several jurisdictions’ domestic laws,
though typically confined to a limited context like private use.  The problem
is that the normative rationale underlying these limited exceptions is under-
studied and, as a result, unsystematically implemented in practice.  Establish-
ing a process-sensitive copyright infringement standard would pose less of a
sea change than it might seem at first blush.
This Article examines how a defendant’s means of copying could func-
tion as a policy lever within international copyright law.  My goal here is to
make the case that a process-sensitive infringement standard is both norma-
tively desirable and legally achievable.  Notwithstanding the capacious defini-
tion of the reproduction right, the same flexibilities within the Berne
Convention that have already allowed states to make targeted exceptions also
allow them to consider the defendant’s method of copying as a structural
feature of the reproduction right itself.  Under the standard I propose here,
the resulting regime would look something like trade secrecy’s tolerance for
honest commercial practices—what I dub here “honest copying practices.”
Copyright and trade secrecy are, in this sense, two branches of the same tree,
each recognizing that copying’s impact on social welfare depends not only
on what is copied and why it is copied (as courts routinely acknowledge
already) but also how.
The Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I surveys the existing law in
several representative jurisdictions along with the international treaties that
constrain those jurisdictions’ decisionmaking.  This Part contrasts copying
methods’ central role in trade secrecy on the one hand with their perceived
irrelevance in copyright on the other.  In Part II, I explain why changing the
method of copying can often change the copying’s impact on social welfare.
I argue that copyright law would function better if it began identifying honest
copying practices that, as in trade secrecy law, were exempt from liability.
Part III turns to questions of implementation.  I conclude that international
copyright law is equipped to distinguish between proper and improper
4 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 9(1), Sept.
9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
5 See id. art. 27(3); see also, e.g., Edward Lee, Copyright, Death, and Taxes, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2012); Silke von Lewinski, International Copyright over the Last 50
Years—A Foreign Perspective, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 581, 584–85 (2003).
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processes through Berne’s Article 9(2), the same mechanism it already uses
to distinguish between proper and improper products and purposes.  As a
matter of international commitments, a state could begin discriminating
between honest and dishonest copying practices today.  It simply needs the
will to do so.
I. COPYING METHODS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
When scrutinizing a defendant’s conduct, trade secrecy’s liability stan-
dard filters out certain processes of appropriation.  Some methods of copying
protected information, “honest commercial practices” in the parlance of
major international agreements (or “proper means” in the equivalent U.S.
common-law terminology), remain perfectly lawful.  By contrast, copyright
law for the most part lacks such a filter.  As this Part discusses, however, traces
of one can be found in various provisions if one squints just hard enough.
A. Trade Secrecy
Trade secrecy law’s distinction between lawful and unlawful means of
copying is virtually as old as the cause of action itself.6  The doctrine, devel-
oped extensively under U.S. common law and a major influence on the inter-
national agreements that would later follow,7 requires courts to consider not
only what the defendant copied but also how.8
Policing the boundary between proper and improper means of acquir-
ing protected secrets is a matter of interpretation.  That a given process
might be otherwise legal outside of trade secrecy law is not dispositive.  It
could violate no independent rule and still constitute misappropriation.9
6 E.g., Tabor v. Hoffman, 23 N.E. 12, 13 (N.Y. 1889) (concluding that once a
medicine is sold to the public, anyone is permitted to use “chemical analysis and a series of
experiments, or . . . any other use of the medicine itself, aided by his own resources only,
[in order to] discover the ingredients and their proportions”).
7 See ELIZABETH A. ROWE & SHARON K. SANDEEN, TRADE SECRECY AND INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS 4 (2015) (“[C]urrent international trade secrecy norms and harmonization
efforts are based principally on the [Uniform Trade Secrets Act].”).
8 See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l v. Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1238 (8th
Cir. 1994) (“[T]he critical inquiry is whether the defendant obtained the secret by
‘improper means.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757(a) (AM. LAW INST.
1939))); Hurst v. Hughes Tool Co., 634 F.2d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding no
improper means where the defendant acquired information by asking an inventor ques-
tions); E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl. 1961)
(“Anyone is at liberty to discover a particular trade secret by any fair means, as by experi-
mentation or by examination and analysis of a particular product.  Moreover, upon discov-
ery the idea may be used with impunity.”); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985),
14 U.L.A. 433 (1990).  While my discussion here focuses on wrongful acquisition, liability
for misappropriation can also occur when one acquires the secret legitimately but subse-
quently uses or discloses it without authorization.
9 See, e.g., E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir.
1970) (holding aerial surveillance to be improper even though the defendants “conducted
all of their activities in public airspace, violated no government aviation standard, did not
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL106.txt unknown Seq: 5  9-NOV-17 13:19
2017] honest  copying  practices 271
Judges have endeavored to preserve some flexibility over what’s in and what’s
out, rejecting the possibility of an exhaustive catalogue and instead promot-
ing a standard that tracks the relevant industry’s accepted norms of “com-
mercial morality and reasonable conduct.”10  Predictably, with such an open-
ended standard, there remain certain means of appropriation whose legal
status is open to reasonable disagreement.11  Nevertheless, some significant
consensuses have emerged over time.  U.S. law has long identified some
processes, such as reverse engineering, as acceptable.12  Others, such as
acquisition through trespass or fraud, have been deemed categorically unac-
ceptable.13  A plaintiff in a trade secret case will always need to devote some
attention to the defendant’s methods.  Even if a defendant can be shown to
have appropriated the plaintiff’s secret, the plaintiff must also show that the
defendant’s particular process of appropriation falls in the wrong bucket.14
This distinction between proper and improper means emerged on the
world stage relatively recently.  Historically, trade secrets had not been
included among the forms of intellectual property governed by international
breach any confidential relation, and did not engage in any fraudulent or illegal
conduct”).
10 Id. at 1016 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST.
1939)).
11 Take, for example, the question of dumpster diving. See William Lynch Schaller,
Secrets of the Trade: Tactical and Legal Considerations from the Trade Secret Plaintiff’s Perspective,
29 REV. LITIG. 729, 753 (2010) (describing the propriety of dumpster diving as “especially
ambiguous” in trade secrecy law). Compare Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 439 So.2d
43, 49–50 (Ala. 1983) (proper), and Tennant Co. v. Advance Mach. Co., 355 N.W.2d 720,
725 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (proper), with Frank W. Winne & Son, Inc. v. Palmer, No. 91-
2239, 1991 WL 155819, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1991) (improper).
12 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (calling reverse
engineering a “fair and honest means . . . [of] starting with the known product and work-
ing backward to divine the process which aided in its development or manufacture”);
Tabor v. Hoffman, 23 N.E. 12, 13 (N.Y. 1889); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 2 (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 1985) (including reverse engineering within a catalog of proper means);
Sharon K. Sandeen, The Limits of Trade Secret Law: Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement and the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act on Which It Is Based, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 537, 561 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J.
Strandburg eds., 2011) (calling reverse engineering an “antithesis of ‘improper means’”).
The United States recently codified the leeway given to reverse engineering in the Defend
Trade Secrets Act, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016). See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(B)
(2012) (providing that reverse engineering may not be considered “improper means”
under the federal law of trade secret misappropriation).
13 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 759 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (includ-
ing “bribing or otherwise inducing employees or others to reveal the information in
breach of duty” in a catalog of improper means).
14 See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 911 (Ct. Cl.
1961) (“Anyone is at liberty to discover a particular trade secret by any fair means, as by
experimentation or by examination and analysis of a particular product.  Moreover, upon
discovery the idea may be used with impunity.”); MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A.,
331 F. Supp. 2d 396 (E.D. Va. 2004) (attempting to parse between proper competitive
intelligence and improper corporate espionage).
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treaties.15  That gap began to be filled in the late 1980s during the early
negotiations over what a few years later would become the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) Agreement.16  The final
text of the treaty requires member states to protect against appropriating
trade secrets “in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices.”17  The
same language had appeared less than a year earlier in the North American
Free Trade Agreement, the first multilateral treaty to provide for trade secret
protection.18
The concept of “honest commercial practices” under TRIPS, like the
U.S. version that preceded it, is flexible by design.  TRIPS gives little gui-
dance on which commercial practices ought to be considered dishonest.  A
footnote to the main text specifies only that such practices would mean “at
least practices such as breach of contract, breach of confidence and induce-
ment to breach.”19  Indeed, TRIPS affords arguably even more flexibility
than domestic U.S. law, which provides a longer (though still nonexhaustive)
list of paradigmatically improper means.20  As others have observed, these
skeletal requirements allow member states to determine what constitutes dis-
honest commercial practices according to their individual cultural and indus-
trial norms.21  In Germany, for instance, one court held that a competitor
may not gain access to secret information by pretending to be a customer.22
The European Union has recently followed the United States’ lead in
designating reverse engineering as an acceptable means of copying.23  The
15 See Sandeen, supra note 12, at 539.
16 Id. at 539, 544.
17 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 39(2).
18 See North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1711, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 612.
The terminology of honest commercial practices harkens back to the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property, whose Article 10bis requires member states to protect
against “[a]ny act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial
matters.”  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 10bis(2), July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583.  Not surprisingly, the TRIPS Agreement’s trade secrecy section
explicitly presents itself as an extension of that treaty. See TRIPS Agreement art. 39(1)
(requiring members to provide trade secrecy protection “[i]n the course of ensuring effec-
tive protection against unfair competition as provided in Article 10bis of the Paris
Convention”).
19 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 39(2) n.10.
20 See ROWE & SANDEEN, supra note 7, at 30 (contrasting Article 39(2) with the
equivalent provision of the UTSA).
21 See ROWE & SANDEEN, supra note 7, at 31 (“[T]he implementation of Article 39 also
depends upon applicable commercial, cultural and social norms, some of which may be
different from those of the United States and EU countries.  In other words, what one
country might define as dishonest commercial practices may be acceptable behaviour in
another country.”); Sandeen, supra note 12, at 559.
22 See MICHAEL KNOSPE, 2 TRADE SECRETS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD § 15:33 (2016).
23 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(B) (2012) (providing that reverse engineering may not be
considered “improper means” under the federal law of trade secret misappropriation);
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) (including reverse engi-
neering within a catalog of proper means).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL106.txt unknown Seq: 7  9-NOV-17 13:19
2017] honest  copying  practices 273
2016 E.U. Trade Secret Directive instructs that “[i]n the interest of innova-
tion and to foster competition, . . . [r]everse engineering of a lawfully
acquired product should be considered as a lawful means of acquiring infor-
mation, except when otherwise contractually agreed.”24  In the ensuing para-
graph, the Directive makes clear that its real target is “parasitic copying or
slavish imitations.”25  The explicit carve out of reverse engineering signals
that the parasitism to be avoided must be something more than just deliber-
ate, verbatim copying.  Reverse engineering, after all, can often yield a per-
fect imitation, indistinguishable from the original.  What makes copying
“parasitic or slavish” is a question of how it’s done.
In short, both the long history of U.S. common law and the compara-
tively short history of international treaty practice have molded trade secrecy
into a fundamentally process-sensitive cause of action.  From jurisdiction to
jurisdiction and from industry to industry, courts can fashion the contours of
liability according to defendant’s chosen method of copying.
B. Copyright
Copyright law sends a more mixed message on copy process than does
trade secrecy.  Reproduction is near universally understood to be the center-
piece of its package of exclusive rights.26  Surprisingly then, the Berne Con-
vention existed for almost a century without any express requirement that
member states include that right.  It was only in 1967 that such a provision
was added.27  The delay was due to disagreement over just what exactly a
reproduction right ought to cover.28
24 Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016
on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and Business Information (Trade Secrets)
Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure, recital 16, 2016 O.J. (L 157/1) 1,
4 (EU); see also id. art. 3(1)(b), at 10 (providing that acquisition of a trade secret shall be
lawful when accomplished through “observation, study, disassembly or testing of a product
or object that has been made available to the public or that is lawfully in the possession of
the acquirer of the information”).
25 Id. recital 17, at 3.
26 See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN & P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT:
PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 307 (3d ed. 2012) (“Historically, the right to make copies of
a copyrighted work is the seminal author’s right . . . .”); SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CON-
VENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886–1986, at 369 (1987)
(calling the reproduction right “undoubtedly the most fundamental right which has been
accorded historically to authors under national legislation”); Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with
Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547, 550 (1997) (“The most
fundamental of all rights in copyright is the exclusive right to reproduce the work.”).
27 See 2 WIPO, RECORDS OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONFERENCE OF STOCKHOLM,
JUNE 11 TO JULY 14, 1967, at 1143 (1971) (“The Programme proposed that a general right of
reproduction should be recognized in Article 9(1) . . . .”).
28 See RICKETSON, supra note 26, at 370 (“[W]hile it is true to say that in 1886 each
country which was to join the projected Union accorded protection to the reproduction
right, it cannot be said that there was agreement between these states as to the scope and
content of this right.  This is undoubtedly the reason why no attempt was made at this stage
to insert a general reproduction right in the Convention.”).
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The text that ultimately garnered consensus does not define the term
“reproduction.”  It does, however, specify that the right extends to such
reproductions “in any manner or form.”29  This final clause appears to lend
the right significant breadth.  Indeed, the World Intellectual Property Organ-
ization (WIPO) commentary on the provision opines that the clause is “wide
enough to cover all methods of reproduction: design, engraving, lithography,
offset and all other printing processes, typewriting, photocopying, xerox,
mechanical or magnetic recording (discs, cassettes, magnetic tape, films,
microfilms, etc.), and all other processes known or yet to be discovered.”30
Similarly, the E.U. Information Society Directive requires member states to
provide authors exclusivity over “reproduction by any means and in any
form, in whole or in part.”31  The U.S. Copyright Act is terser, simply grant-
ing a right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies.”32  But courts inter-
preting that provision have left little doubt about its breadth, explaining that
a laboriously made copy is just as much a reproduction as an easily made
one.33
Nevertheless, there are glimpses of process sensitivity scattered through
both international and domestic laws.  The E.U. Information Society Direc-
tive, for example, treats digital copying differently than analogue.  Its thirty-
eighth recital states:
 Member States should be allowed to provide for an exception or limita-
tion to the reproduction right for certain types of reproduction of audio,
visual and audio-visual material for private use, accompanied by fair com-
pensation.  This may include the introduction or continuation of remunera-
29 Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 9(1).
30 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION [WIPO], GUIDE TO THE BERNE CON-
VENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (PARIS ACT, 1971) 54
(1978) [hereinafter WIPO Guide]; see also ZOHAR EFRONI, ACCESS-RIGHT: THE FUTURE OF
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT LAW 220 (2011) (noting that the language “[in] any manner” refers to
“technical procedure of making a copy; in other words, manner is the reproduction
technology”).
31 Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May
2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the
Information Society, art. 2, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16 [hereinafter Information Society
Directive]; see also IRINI STAMATOUDI & PAUL TORREMANS, The Information Society Directive, in
EU COPYRIGHT LAW: A COMMENTARY 395, 402 (Irini Stamatoudi & Paul Torremans eds.,
2014) (“This [article of the Directive] covers both analogue and digital reproductions of
the work . . . . It is therefore irrelevant whether a wooden sculpture is photographed,
copied by hand from the photograph into a marble, then photographed again and loaded
on a site on the Internet.  All these acts are considered to be reproductions.”).
32 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012).
33 See, e.g., Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(observing that copyright’s inquiry into unlawful copying turns on “whether [the defen-
dant’s] end product . . . is substantially similar to [the plaintiff’s], not how it got that way”);
Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1237 (3d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he
fact that it will take a great deal of effort to copy a copyrighted work does not mean that
the copier is not a copyright infringer.  The issue . . . is simply whether the copyright
holder’s expression has been copied, not how difficult it was to do the copying.”).
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tion schemes to compensate for the prejudice to rightholders.  Although
differences between those remuneration schemes affect the functioning of
the internal market, those differences, with respect to analogue private
reproduction, should not have a significant impact on the development of
the information society.  Digital private copying is likely to be more wide-
spread and have a greater economic impact. Due account should therefore be
taken of the differences between digital and analogue private copying and a distinction
should be made in certain respects between them.34
Reflecting this greater leeway for nondigital copying, Article 5.3’s grand-
father clause allows member states to limit or remove liability for “use in cer-
tain other cases of minor importance where exceptions or limitations already
exist under national law, provided that they only concern analogue uses.”35
The implicit rationale is that analogue copying is more difficult for the copy-
ist and therefore less economically threatening to the owner.
Some E.U. states have implemented such an exception in their respec-
tive domestic laws.  Italy, for example, expressly permits reproduction for
personal use when the copy is “made by hand or by a means of reproduction
unsuitable for circulating or diffusing the work in public.”36  Likewise, Ger-
many and Hungary permit private reproduction of complete books and peri-
odicals if done manually.37  Outside the European Union, a similar carve out
appears in Japan’s copyright law, which allows users to reproduce works for
private use unless “[such] reproduction is made by means of automatic
reproduction machines . . . [placed] for the use by the public.”38  In other
words, copying with a paintbrush and canvas is permissible.  Copying with a
photocopier is not.
In the U.S. Copyright Act, such process-based limitations are largely
absent.  There is, however, one significant exception.  The compulsory
license for reproducing musical works, commonly known as the “mechanical”
license, explicitly distinguishes between automatically duplicating an existing
recording and creating a new recording from scratch.39  One who simply hits
copy and paste on a computer cannot rely on the compulsory license without
first securing permission directly from the owner of the copyright in the
reproduced recording.  By contrast, one who rerecords the musical work in
the studio is relieved of that extra burden—even if the result sounds identical
to a digital duplicate.  Measured against the backdrop of the rest of the U.S.
Copyright Act, this compulsory license regime is a striking departure.  It is
the only section of the statute that discriminates between the means of copy-
34 Information Society Directive, supra note 31, recital 38 (emphasis added).
35 Id. art. 5(3)(o).
36 See GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 26, at 381.
37 See Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG] [Act on Copyright and Related Rights], Sept. 9,
1965, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI], as amended, art. 53(4) (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_urhg/englisch_urhg.html; Act No. LXXVI of 1999 on Copyright, art.
35(2) (Hung.), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/hu/hu084en.pdf.
38 Chosakuken Ho [Copyright Act] Law No. 48 of 1970, art. 30(1)(i) (Japan).
39 See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2012).
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ing when assessing liability.  For all other copyrightable subject matter, one is
seemingly the same as any other.
Unlike trade secrecy law, then, copyright law contains no general frame-
work for filtering potential claims according to the process employed by the
copyist.  The law in several countries at least gestures in that direction by
carving out laborious copying for preferential treatment under limited cir-
cumstances.  But those limits are strong.  They are either restricted to purely
private uses, as in Italy and Japan, or to a specific subject matter category, as
in the United States.  This uneven implementation does not appear to be the
product of careful judgment.  Even as both domestic and international copy-
right laws seem to accept the premise that the process of copying can matter,
that premise has not been rigorously theorized or consistently applied.  In
Part II, I explain why it deserves a more significant place than it has yet
received in determining the scope of infringement liability.
II. WHY COPY PROCESS MATTERS
If you’d like to watch a trailer for a recent or upcoming Hollywood
blockbuster, you could watch the original studio version.  Or you could watch
one of the over 200 videos (and counting) in CineFix’s “Homemade Movies”
series, a collection of self-described “creative remakes of your favorite trailers
and movie scenes” containing “shot-for-shot remakes using low-budget DIY
materials.”40  The producers “analyse every shot to see what the important
details are” and “watch it repeatedly with the performers to memorize the
timing of everything before taking a stab at it.”41  The resulting films range
from Star Wars to Frozen to The Amazing Spider-Man 2.
The “Homemade Movies” series is part of a broader phenomenon of
laborious re-creations, some visibly amateur but many of professional quality.
Consider a few other recent ones.  After studying Ansel Adams’s iconic
Autumn Moon photograph, a group of astronomers reverse engineer the
exact location and the once-every-nineteen-years moment in which the moon
would return to the same spot as it did when Adams clicked the shutter, and
photographers gather then and there to recreate the image with scientific
precision.42  An appropriation artist faithfully replicates a photograph of a
musical group by stripping out the background and shading, projecting that
altered image onto a piece of wood, painting the image onto the wood, and
then gluing 1000 shards of broken vinyl records on top of it.43  Fans of the
40 See CineFix, Homemade Movies, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=
PL1AXWu-gGX6Jto21cZ4vrtBZ4fW6s6Vkz (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
41 Tom Eames, CineFix’s Homemade Movies Interview: “Sock Puppets Are Especially Fun,”
DIGITAL SPY (May 7, 2013), http://www.digitalspy.com/fun/news/a479352/cinefixs-home
made-movies-interview-sock-puppets-are-especially-fun/.
42 See Roger W. Sinnott, An Ansel Adams Encore, SKY & TELESCOPE, Jan. 2006, at 93.
43 See Friedman v. Guetta, No. CV 10-00014, 2011 WL 3510890, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May
27, 2011); Sean Bonner, Thierry Guetta, aka Mr. Brainwash Sued for Copyright Infringement over
Run DMC Image, BOING BOING (Jan. 6, 2011), https://boingboing.net/2011/01/26/
thierry-guetta-aka-m.html.
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film Raiders of the Lost Ark remake the entire film, shot for shot, in a version so
astoundingly similar as to earn its own documentary and critical praise
declaring that “[m]imicry can be even harder than the original.”44  A young
man spends months recreating a Beyonce´ music video, imitating every bit of
choreography, cinematography, and even facial expressions, then posts it to
YouTube, where it becomes a minor viral sensation.45  Two artists spend
weeks building detailed scale models replicating famous historical photo-
graphs like the Hindenburg crash, the Loch Ness monster, and the first
moon landing, relying on physical materials from tarps to cotton balls to
achieve the desired visual effect.46
What all these productions have in common is a deliberately resource-
intensive copy process.  Expressive content that could have been achieved
using a few keystrokes on a computer is instead achieved through far more
time-intensive methods.  The reasons why second comers would want to
make such an investment vary.  Some do it to learn how to do it, others want
to tap a market that prizes handmade products, still others prefer a difficult
process for its expressive value, some might simply find the experience fun,
and then there are those who just want the attention.  Add those reasons
together and it means that a significant number of copyists are not always
going to use the cheapest means of copying available.
Yet it is precisely the cheapest means that has given rise to much of mod-
ern copyright law.47  Sticking with that baseline even in a world of deliber-
44 Amy Nicholson, After 33 Years and an Airplane Explosion, Their Raiders of the Lost Ark
Remake Is Almost Complete. Are They?, LA WEEKLY (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.laweekly.com/
arts/after-33-years-and-an-airplane-explosion-their-raiders-of-the-lost-ark-remake-is-almost-
complete-are-they-5205358; RAIDERS!: THE STORY OF THE GREATEST FAN FILM EVER MADE
(Jeremy Coon Productions 2015).
45 See Jen Carlson, Meet Ton Do-Nguyen, The Snuggie “Countdown” Kid Beyonce´ Calls “Bril-
liant,” GOTHAMIST (July 21, 2012), http://gothamist.com/2012/07/21/we_talk_to_ton_
do-nguyen_the_snuggi.php.
46 See Sheena McKenzie, 12 Famous Photos Painstakingly Recreated with Miniature Models,
CNN (Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/style/article/historys-most-famous-photos-
recreated-miniature-models/index.html.
47 As the U.S. Supreme Court has observed,
From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to signifi-
cant changes in technology.  Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copy-
ing equipment—the printing press—that gave rise to the original need for
copyright protection. . . . Thus, for example, the development and marketing of
player pianos and perforated rolls of music preceded the enactment of the Copy-
right Act of 1909; innovations in copying techniques gave rise to the statutory
exemption for library copying embodied in § 108 of the 1976 revision of the Cop-
yright law; the development of the technology that made it possible to retransmit
television programs by cable or by microwave systems prompted the enactment of
the complex provisions set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(2)(B) and § 111(d)(5)
(1982 ed.) after years of detailed congressional study.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430, 430 n.11 (1984) (foot-
note omitted) (citations omitted); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 42 (2003) (“[M]odern technology
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ately difficult copying hurts social welfare in three different ways.  I discuss
them below.
A. The Ratio Between Imitation Cost and Innovation Cost
All else being equal, the economic harm from imitation falls as the cost
of imitation rises.  Stringent copyright protection is meant at least in part to
provide an artificial bulwark against quick and cheap copying (relative to the
cost of creating innovation).  But if a particular form of copying is naturally
neither quick nor cheap to begin with, that bulwark’s social costs come closer
to overwhelming its social benefits.
This proposition is already implicit within trade secrecy policy and, to a
lesser extent, copyright policy.  On the trade secrecy side, inflated imitation
cost is a standard justification for allowing reverse engineering.48  By defini-
tion, the information protected as a trade secret is difficult to uncover
through recreating the innovator’s steps.49  That difficulty gives some com-
fort to policymakers who would otherwise worry about how to insulate invest-
ments from ruinous competition.  By making second comers shoulder
enough imitation cost, the law better allows innovators to recoup their
expenditures.  It’s thus unsurprising that, as discussed in the previous Part,
reverse engineering is widely recognized as a paradigmatically proper means
of appropriating secret information.50  In the United States, this cost-sharing
function of the reverse-engineering exception dates back to some of its earli-
est trade-secret jurisprudence.51
Though not as well entrenched, a similar rationale occasionally appears
in the copyright context.  As discussed above, the economic distinction
between cheap and costly copying is already embedded within the E.U.’s
has reduced the time it takes to make copies, as well as enabled perfect or near-perfect
copies to be made at low cost, and as a result the importance of copyright protection has
increased for many types of expressive work.”).
48 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1590 (2002) (defending trade secrecy’s allowance of
reverse engineering because “the costs and time required for reverse engineering already
protect most innovators”).
49 See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) (limiting
protection to information that is “not . . . readily ascertainable by proper means”); TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 2, art. 39(2)(a) (limiting protection to information that is “not . . .
generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally
deal with the kind of information in question”).
50 See supra Part I.
51 See, e.g., A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co. of Ohio, 73 F.2d 531, 539
(6th Cir. 1934) (observing that law should not “advantage the competitor who by unfair
means . . . obtains the desired knowledge without himself paying the price in labor, money,
or machines expended by the discoverer”); Tabor v. Hoffman, 23 N.E. 12, 13 (N.Y. 1889)
(concluding that once a medicine is sold to the public, anyone is permitted to use “chemi-
cal analysis and a series of experiments, or . . . any other use of the medicine itself, aided by
his own resources only, [in order to] discover the ingredients and their proportions”).
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Information Society Directive.52  Italy’s exception for handmade copying
turns on the method’s “unsuitab[ility] for circulating or diffusing the work in
public.”53  Together with the distribution right that itself raises the cost of
competing with the owner, permitting reproduction only through laborious
processes lowers the possibility that cheaply made private copies could slip
through the cracks and enter the market.  The caselaw interpreting the
mechanical license in the United States is even more explicit about the
importance of imitation costs.  Under the previous version of its Copyright
Act, which contained a more tersely worded and ambiguous license provision
than today’s incarnation, courts were called on to determine whether a given
use of a musical work was “similar” to the act of recording it for the first
time.54  That provision teed up the question of whether the process of
mechanically or digitally duplicating an existing recording (as opposed to
recording a new performance of it) was similar to the initial process of
recording it.  Resoundingly, courts answered “no.”  The difference in imita-
tion costs loomed large.  As one appellate court explained:
[W]hile the difference between making a recording and duplicating a
recording (making a recording of a recording) may seem negligible semanti-
cally, the impact of the latter upon the copyright interest of the composer is
clear.  The copyright holder’s benefit is substantially reduced by the inevita-
ble lower profits which result from duplicators who can re-record for a frac-
tion of the original cost and thus undersell the authorized recorder.55
There is thus an economically straightforward argument that copyright
case outcomes should depend in part on the ratio between the author’s inno-
vation cost and the copyist’s imitation cost.  The less the former outstrips the
latter, the less the need for liability.  Still puzzling, however, is the inconsis-
tency with which this insight has been operationalized.  Start, for example,
with the European position that costly methods only affect the legal status of
the copying when done in private.56  Why should that be so?  If a method of
copying requires such high fixed costs that it approaches the cost of the ini-
tial creation,57 the copyist is not economically better off than the original
author.  The average cost of production for either of them would be roughly
52 Information Society Directive, supra note 31, recital 38 (recognizing that relative to
“analogue” copying, digital copying is likely to be “more widespread and have a greater
economic impact”).
53 See GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 26, at 381.
54 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970) (amended 1976).
55 Heilman v. Bell, 583 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1978).  For similar conclusions, see
Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colo. Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285, 288 (10th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 (W.D. Okla. 1974); and Fame Publ’g Co. v.
S & S Distribs., Inc., 363 F. Supp. 984, 988 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
56 See Information Society Directive, supra note 31, recital 38; id. art. 5(3)(o).
57 For an entertaining example, see TIM’S VERMEER (High Delft Pictures 2013), a docu-
mentary that follows a novice’s efforts to recreate a Vermeer painting using the process
that, according to his hypothesis, the artist himself had once used.  Performing that pro-
cess required years of preparation, including building the optical devices on which he
believed Vermeer relied, constructing a full-scale replica of the room that was the subject
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the same.  For some copy processes, then, even reproduction beyond the
strictly private would leave the owner’s core markets intact.  Another exam-
ple is the United States’ invocation of copy process for mechanical licenses in
music but nowhere else.  The same economic arguments that courts empha-
sized for music apply with equal force for other subject matter categories,
particularly visual and audiovisual materials.
B. Educative Copying
A second social cost of treating re-creations the same as digital dupli-
cates is inhibiting the process of learning by doing.  As any art student knows,
a great way to master one’s craft is to copy a master.  Recreating a piece from
scratch lets the copyist peer under the hood to see how it works.58  Hands-on
copying generates more than just another copy; it also generates experiential
learning.  It is the reason why New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art, like
several other peer institutions, allows visitors to set up an easel and recreate
paintings in its galleries in order to “celebrate[ ] intensive technical study
[and] deep observation” and “encourage[ ] sustained engagement with a
diverse range of media.”59
To recognize any of this is simply to acknowledge that reverse engineer-
ing has an educative payoff not just for technologists but for artists as well.
When it comes to technological creativity, the type typically of more rele-
vance to patent law than to copyright law, the point should already be famil-
iar.  In undergraduate engineering curricula, dissecting and reassembling
working models has become a routine form of acquiring expertise.60  The
practice has been found to increase awareness of the design process,
encourage development of curiosity, and increase motivation and conceptual
retention.61  When those students leave the classroom and enter the indus-
try, reverse engineering’s utility to long-term innovation still remains.  Auto-
of the original painting, mixing pigments, and finally a painstaking several months of put-
ting brush to canvas.
58 See Daniel Gervais, The Derivative Right, or Why Copyright Law Protects Foxes Better than
Hedgehogs, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 785, 851 (2013) (“By copying a master’s work, the
‘pupil’ might at least get a glimpse of the great author’s mind, which would seem like a
normatively desirable process.”); Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian Copyright, 91
IOWA L. REV. 609, 646 (2006) (“In copying technique, one learns technique; in copying
style, one learns style.  If the copyist is lucky, he finds his own style in the end, but even if
he does not, his mastery of technique makes him capable of creating beauty.”); Malcolm
Jones, There’s Nothing Wrong—And a Lot That’s Right—About Copying Other Artists, DAILY
BEAST (Jan. 26, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/01/26/there-s-noth-
ing-wrong-and-a-lot-that-s-right-about-copying-other-artists.html; Jonathan Jones, Why
Would-Be Artists Should Imitate the Greats, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2009), http://www
.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2009/sep/19/aspiring-artists-should-imitate-masters.
59 Copyist Program, METRO. MUSEUM OF ART, http://www.metmuseum.org/events/pro-
grams/met-creates/copyist-program (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
60 See Katie Grantham et al., A Study on Situated Cognition: Product Dissection’s Effect on
Redesign Activities, ADVANCES IN ENGINEERING EDUC., Summer 2013, at 2.
61 Id.
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motive manufacturers, for instance, regularly take apart competitors’ models
and put them back together in order to investigate design choices that they
might not have otherwise appreciated.62  As one analyst explained, “[a]s
much as you think you know . . . nothing beats picking up the parts, feeling
them, weighing them, and knowing the processes that made them.”63
Once we cross over to copyrightable subject matter—a world less likely
to be catering to anyone with “engineer” in a job title—reverse engineering
might seem a more remote concept.  But it is not.  Taking apart a Haydn
sonata is a lot like taking apart a Hyundai Sonata.  In the eighteenth century,
a young J.S. Bach taught himself compositional practice by arranging others’
music.64  In the twentieth, a legion of composers, producers, and instrumen-
talists did the same thing.65  The same learning-by-copying process has bene-
fited the work of artists, filmmakers, and photographers as well.
Educational uses, of course, have traditionally received wider leeway for
copying protected works.  But that leeway often isn’t sufficient to immunize
recreating another’s work without authorization.  The Berne Convention
purports to permit member states to insulate educational uses, but the rele-
vant provision speaks only about “teaching.”66  In the case of formal cour-
sework where the copying is performed or at least supervised by an
instructor, perhaps Berne provides some cover.  Outside the classroom con-
text, however, the exception’s applicability is dubious.67  The problem with
that narrow scope is that learning by doing can happen even without a class-
room.  Indeed, trade secrecy theory has emphasized precisely this insight in
62 See Carl Hoffman, The Teardown Artists, WIRED (Feb. 1, 2006), https://www.wired
.com/2006/02/teardown/.
63 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
64 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright
and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 610 (2006).
65 See, e.g., PAUL F. BERLINER, THINKING IN JAZZ: THE INFINITE ART OF IMPROVISATION
95–97 (1994) (describing various ways in which, “[j]ust as children learn to speak their
native language by imitating older competent speakers, so young musicians learn to speak
jazz by imitating seasoned improvisers”); JOHN SEABROOK, THE SONG MACHINE: INSIDE THE
HIT FACTORY 59 (2015) (recounting how Clive Calder and Mutt Lange’s early experience
of “taking hit songs apart, figuring out how they worked, and putting them back together
again . . . gave both men a keen appreciation for what went into making a hit, knowledge
that served them both very well later on”).
66 Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 10(2).
67 See WIPO Guide, supra note 30, ¶ 10.10 (observing that the term “teaching” in Arti-
cle 10.2 refers to “educational institutes, municipal and state schools and private schools,”
but that “mere scientific research is not within the scope of the paragraph”); RICKETSON,
supra note 26, at 497–98 (“[T]he word ‘teaching’ was to include teaching at all levels—in
educational institutions and universities, municipal and State schools, and private schools.
Education outside these institutions, for instance general teaching available to the general
public but not included in the above categories, should be excluded.” (quoting 2 WIPO,
RECORDS OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONFERENCE OF STOCKHOLM, JUNE 11 TO JULY 14,
1967, at 1148 (1971))).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL106.txt unknown Seq: 16  9-NOV-17 13:19
282 notre dame law review [vol. 93:1
pushing for greater tolerance of reverse engineering.68  As Judge Posner has
noted, reverse engineering receives privileged treatment in trade secrecy
doctrine because it “involves the use of technical skills that we want to
encourage.”69  The point is equally applicable to much of copyrightable sub-
ject matter, yet Berne’s educational use provision seems oblivious to it.
The mismatch is partly due to the fact that Berne seems to classify educa-
tional use by intent rather than by effect.  Of course, students enrolled in a
course of study are trying to learn something (or so we teachers hope, at
least).  That institutionalized intent is a perfectly good proxy for the socially
desirable outcome of actual learning, but it is worth remembering that it is
the outcome itself that we are trying to promote.  That outcome can occur
even absent a specific intent to achieve it.  One might be copying the hard
way in order to show off and draw attention to oneself, another might be
doing it to gain competitive intelligence, and still another might be doing it
for sheer enjoyment.  None of these purposes is educational in the sense that
Article 10.2 privileges.  Yet each of them is capable of teaching the copyist
valuable skills all the same.
In certain jurisdictions, some—though, as I will return to shortly, not
all—of this educative copying could be permissible under laws that generally
exempt private reproductions.  Within the European Union, the Information
Society Directive permits member states to withhold liability for copying
done “for private use and for ends that are neither directly nor indirectly
commercial.”70  As discussed above, a few member states have taken advan-
68 See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 47, at 370 (“[R]everse engineering will often
generate knowledge about the product being reverse engineered that will make it possible
to improve it or develop or improve other products.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, A Legal Tangle of
Secrets and Disclosures in Trade: Tabor v. Hoffman and Beyond, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT
THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 286 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg
eds., 2014) (“[R]equiring third parties to reverse engineer—rather than use the secret
directly—might also be helpful to the third parties (and society at large) by teaching them
more about the information, its uses, and further refinements.”); Jerome H. Reichman,
How Trade Secrecy Law Generates a Natural Semicommons of Innovative Know-how, in THE LAW
AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 189 (Rochelle
C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2011) (“[T]he process of reverse engineering itself, by methodically
extracting the innovator’s know-how from a given application, tends to generate technical
improvements over time, including cost-saving modes of manufacture that reduce prices to
consumers.”).
69 Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1991).
70 Information Society Directive, supra note 31, art. 5(2)(b).  The provision also condi-
tions use on payment of “fair compensation” to the rightsholder, id., though recital 35 of
the Directive leaves open the possibility that the amount of such compensation could be
zero “where the prejudice to the rightholder would be minimal.” Id. recital 35; see also
Case C-463/12, Copydan Ba˚ndkopi v. Nokia Danmark A/S, 2015 E.C.R. ¶¶ 56–62, http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=162691&pageIndex=0&doc
lang=EN (holding that E.U. member states retain discretion to determine whether a partic-
ular harm falls below the minimal level that would require any compensation under Article
5(2)(b)).
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tage of this exemption to distinguish between manual and mechanical copy
processes.71
Yet this distinction has been implemented more narrowly than it
deserves, largely because commentators tend to ignore its pedagogic virtues.
Typically, they treat tolerance for private copying as a pragmatic sacrifice,
pointing to the unrealistically steep monitoring costs that would need to be
incurred if the right were to be worth anything to its owners.72  On this the-
ory, an ideal regime would allow the rightholder to exclude (or at least col-
lect a set fee through a compulsory license) for every private copy.  Only
thanks to the practical difficulty of tracking all those unobservable copies do
private copyists get a free pass.
To be sure, some have noted that withholding a right to exclude private
copying can yield genuine social benefits.  Allowing such copying to proceed
without need for clearing individual licenses curbs the potential for corpo-
rate surveillance and promotes access to information.73  But these benefits
would flow regardless of how the copying is done, whether by hand or by
automation.  So long as the various methods of copying remain bundled
together like this, policymakers face a binary choice between exempting all
of them and exempting none of them.
When the choice is framed as all or none, some may very well choose
none.  And indeed, some do.  Several E.U. jurisdictions do not exercise their
prerogative under the Information Society Directive to offer an exception to
private copying.74  In the United States, existing fair use doctrine covers
some private copying, such as taping television broadcasts,75 but not necessa-
rily the kind that would help those recreating works by hand.  Courts have
held that downloading a free file online for personal consumption counts as
an infringing commercial use because the downloader avoids the copy’s cus-
tomary market price.76  Presumably, unless copying methods were to matter,
repainting a Picasso and hanging it on the wall should count for the same
71 See supra Section I.B.
72 See, e.g., ANTO´NIO VITORINO, RECOMMENDATIONS RESULTING FROM THE MEDIATION ON
PRIVATE COPYING AND REPROGRAPHY LEVIES 20 (2013) (“[T]he main rationale underlying
the private copying exception is linked to the practical difficulty of the licensing of copies
made by consumers for their private use.”); WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY ON PRIVATE COPYING: LAW AND PRACTICE 2015 5 (2016) [hereinafter
WIPO International Survey] (commenting that countries exempt private copying because
it is “practically impossible to grant permission to large numbers of individuals, or to moni-
tor how such permission is subsequently used”); Christophe Geiger & Franciska
Scho¨nheer, The Information Society Directive, in E.U. COPYRIGHT LAW: A COMMENTARY 395,
473 (Irini Stamatoudi & Paul Torremans eds., 2014) (“[I]t has been held that unlike limi-
tations based on higher ranking considerations such as access to information, the private
copying exception is merely justified by reasons of practicability.”).
73 See Geiger & Scho¨nheer, supra note 72, at 473.
74 See WIPO International Survey, supra note 72, at 3–4 (noting that within the Euro-
pean Union, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Malta have no private copying exception).
75 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
76 See BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 890–91 (7th Cir. 2005); A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Sega Enters. Ltd. v.
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reason.77  Moreover, there is some evidence that institutional actors do not
consider existing fair use law to be a meaningful shield.  Many museums
offering copyist programs carve out any item to which they do not control the
copyright, including any outside the permanent collection.78  If fair use relia-
bly excused such handmade repainting, such exclusions would not be
necessary.
Part of the hesitance to embrace a full-throated educational-use excep-
tion may be some justifiable concern that such learning-by-doing arguments
go too far.  Maybe copying can indeed help one create something new.  But,
after all, so can virtually any human activity.  Serendipity is a major contribu-
tor to innovation,79 yet who would argue in favor of free access to any prod-
uct or service that might play a role in serendipitous discovery?  Jane
Ginsburg has noted that the inputs into a prospective author’s creation pro-
cess are myriad; one might just as well be inspired by drinking cups of coffee
as by copying works of authorship.80  Once one starts arguing that potential
inputs should be free simply because they are potential inputs, it is hard to
find a natural stopping point.
Focusing on the process of copying, however, provides one.  Not every
act of reproduction need be exempted.  Policymakers could distinguish
between retracing an author’s steps by hand and digitally duplicating the end
product.  Hands-on copy processes tend to reveal more about inner workings
of the copied content than does automated replication on a computer.81  A
country like Italy, which already makes such distinctions based expressly on
the cost-ratio grounds discussed in the previous Section,82 has even more
reason to do so than it acknowledges.  Copying that is harder to accomplish
MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 687 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (downloading free video games counts as
commercial).
77 See Fishman, supra note 3, at 914–15.
78 See, e.g., FAQ, BROOKLYN MUSEUM, https://www.brooklynmuseum.org/about/faq/
(last visited Oct. 6, 2017) (“Copying is restricted to works in the permanent collec-
tions . . . .”); Tips for Visiting the Frye, FRYE ART MUSEUM, fryemuseum.org/tips/ (last visited
Oct. 6, 2017) (“It is prohibited to copy works of art on loan to the Frye Art Museum and
works of art restricted by copyright.”); Visiting FAQ and Announcements, CLEVELAND MUSEUM
OF ART, http://www.clevelandart.org/visit/visitor-information/visiting-faq-and-announce-
ments (last visited Oct. 6, 2017) (“It is prohibited to copy works of art on loan to the
museum and works of art restricted by copyright.”).
79 See generally Sean B. Seymore, Serendipity, 88 N.C. L. REV. 185 (2009).
80 Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1383,
1390 (2014).
81 Of course, it could also be said that even if employing computerized duplication
doesn’t teach you much about the content, it might still teach you something about some-
thing else—say, computers.  Once one begins looking past authorship and considering the
full range of activities worth learning how to do, my argument wouldn’t seem to reduce
much the existing sprawl of the learning-by-doing rationale.  But I don’t consider it copy-
right policy’s job to optimize every conceivable source of social welfare.  As far as copyright
is concerned, a focus on authorship remains appropriate.
82 See supra Section II.A.
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not only poses less risk to the original author upstream but also offers more
educational payoff to the copyists downstream.
C. Audience Preferences
Thus far, it might seem as if the next step would be to encourage adop-
tion of more Italy-style private copying regimes.  Doing that much would be
an improvement.  But it would still be short of ideal.  The copyist isn’t the
only one who can benefit from laborious methods of copying.  Often
enough, audiences do too.
Consumers may value a handmade re-creation differently than a digital
duplicate, even if they are facially identical.  The remade Ansel Adams photo-
graphs, Beyonce´ video, and Raiders film mentioned in this Part’s introductory
Section each acquire particular expressive meaning precisely because some-
one other than the original author used a discernably high level of talent and
industriousness to accomplish them.  As one reviewer noted in the case of the
Raiders remake, Spielberg had a valuable resource that his downstream imita-
tors lacked—creative freedom: “If a shot wasn’t working, he could change it.
If a stunt failed, he could scrap it.  By contrast, [the recreated film] was man-
acled to Spielberg’s caprice. . . . Mimicry can be even harder than the
original.”83
In one sense, the notion that audiences would celebrate the skill neces-
sary to achieve verisimilitude is nothing new.  Viewers have long delighted at
the display of artistic skill, and certain acts of faithful replication can be dis-
tinctively skillful.  In the sixteenth century, the Duke of Mantua was actually
pleased to discover that his putative Raphael painting had been a forgery
because, as one of his contemporaries recounts the story, he valued it “even
more, for it is something out of the course of nature that a man of excellence
should imitate the manner of another so well, and should make a copy so
like.”84  In recent years, this phenomenon has been captured by the lab
experiments of George Newman and Paul Bloom, who found that partici-
pants tended to rate an original artwork and an identical copy equally valua-
ble when they were told that a low amount of effort was required to create
the original but a high amount of effort was required to duplicate it.85  Those
results make sense if one thinks about images or film the same way one
thinks about the performing arts: endpoints of a dynamic process rather than
a static product.86  When audiences are given information about a piece of
art’s history of production, they receive it as performance.
83 Nicholson, supra note 44.
84 5 GIORGIO VASARI, LIVES OF THE MOST EMINENT PAINTERS SCULPTORS AND ARCHITECTS
108–09 (Gaston du C. De Vere trans., Philip Lee Warner 1913) (1550).
85 See George E. Newman & Paul Bloom, Art and Authenticity: The Importance of Originals
in Judgments of Value, 141 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 558, 564–65 (2012).
86 See Denis Dutton, Artistic Crimes, 19 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 302, 305 (1979) (“If we see
an actor or a dancer or a violinist at work, we are constantly conscious of human agency.
Less immediately apparent is the element of performance in a painting . . . . Yet we are in
such cases no less confronted with the results of human agency.”).
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In another sense, however, there is something distinctly modern about
valuing the presence of human labor in production processes.  Walter Benja-
min famously wrote that as images would become more mechanically repro-
ducible, their “aura” of authenticity would dissipate.87  As the line between
original and copy blurred, he thought, all copies would be equal.  Yet Benja-
min missed the full implications of his foundational insight.  As mechanically
reproduced copies proliferate, auras don’t necessarily disappear.  They relo-
cate.  Today, any nonmechanically reproduced copies can acquire an aura all
their own.88  As one recent essay argued:
No matter how mechanical a reproduction is, once there is no huge gap in
the process of production between version n and version n + I, the clear-cut
distinction between the original and its reproduction becomes less crucial—
and the aura begins to hesitate and is uncertain where it should land.89
If all of this talk of aesthetics and aura seems a bit too metaphysical,
think of Etsy.  Think of the Arts and Crafts movement a century ago, the
“maker” movement today, and the continuing growth of DIY culture.90
Their premise is that the direct involvement of de-industrialized, individual-
ized labor in making reproductions—of furniture, of clothing, of jewelry, or
of just about anything else—enhances those reproductions’ value, whether
measured in economic or cultural terms.  Indeed, a 2015 marketing study
found that consumers tend to perceive handmade objects as being more val-
uable than machine-made ones, even when holding functional quality con-
stant and even when the producer remains anonymous.91  If you’ve ever paid
more for a handmade object, you’ve already internalized this lesson.
And so it is for expressive works.  What is true for everyday items can be
true of cultural artifacts.  Copyright theory treats reproductions as substitutes,
but substitutability may depend on process as much as on product.  Audi-
87 Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in ILLUMINA-
TIONS 217 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., Schocken Books 1968) (1935).
88 See WINNIE WON YIN WONG, VAN GOGH ON DEMAND: CHINA AND THE READYMADE 16
(2013) (“In the culture of the ubiquitous copy . . . it is the manual technology of reproduc-
tion—that is, hand-copied painting—that has been reinvested with a certain, though now
paradoxical, authenticity.”).
89 Bruno Latour & Adam Lowe, The Migration of the Aura or How to Explore the Original
Through Its Fac Similes, in SWITCHING CODES: THINKING THROUGH DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY IN
THE HUMANITIES AND THE ARTS 275, 283 (Thomas Bartscherer & Roderick Coover eds.,
2011); see also Daniel Zalewski, The Factory of Fakes, NEW YORKER (Nov. 28, 2016), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/11/28/the-factory-of-fakes.
90 See, e.g., Michele Krugh, Joy in Labour: The Politicization of Craft from the Arts and Crafts
Movement to Etsy, 44 CANADIAN REV. AM. STUD. 281, 282 (2014) (noting that craft advocates’
“focus on ‘hand making’ is used to make explicit the difference between the labour
involved in individually producing objects and that involved in the context of the division
of labour for mass producing objects”); James Fallows, Why the Maker Movement Matters: Part
1, the Tools Revolution, ATLANTIC (June 5, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2016/06/why-the-maker-movement-matters-part-1-the-tools-revolution/485720/.
91 See Christoph Fuchs et al., The Handmade Effect: What’s Love Got to Do with It?, 79 J.
MKTG. 98, 107 (2015).
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ences can perceive a second comer’s re-creation of an existing work as a com-
plement in a way that they would never perceive a mechanical duplicate.92
To burden the production of such re-creations is not to stem the flow of
identical goods, as the standard theory would suggest, but to inhibit the
development of qualitatively distinct goods.
Some second-comers who elect a more difficult means of copying may
be trying to tap into that demand.  For others, market demand can be secon-
dary.  The same scarcity of human labor that drives audience reactions might
also drive a copyist’s communicative goals in the first instance.  It is one rea-
son why, for example, some filmmakers prefer to use analogue rather than
digital media to record photographs and motion pictures.93  As one of those
filmmakers tells it, today’s Michelangelos thinking through how to make the
next sculpture of David have two choices: “I can scan David’s body and print
out the perfect proportions on a 3-D printer, or I can start from a block of
marble and chip away.  The process is different and I have to be more crea-
tive with marble to achieve a result that becomes a masterpiece.”94
Here lie the limits of quarantining re-creations within a private-copying
regime.  Private copying has no audience.  If legal tolerance for such copying
exists only within an exemption for private activity, consumer interests are
never addressed.  A private-copying exception would not help many of the
artists discussed in this Article, like the one who jigsawed those 1000 shards of
vinyl records together to recreate a protected image,95 or the ones who cre-
ate three-dimensional scale models of famous photographs.96  The minute
those reproductions are publicly displayed, they are no longer private.
For audiences to benefit from hands-on re-creations, copyists will thus
need a different path to permissibility.  Of course, there is always direct
licensing with the copyright owner.  But I am skeptical that the market is
going to solve the clearance problem on its own.  All of the uses discussed
here are by definition hard to do.  The standard economic case for copyright
depends on copying being meaningfully cheaper than original creation.
When that condition is absent, it seems backwards to require the copyist to
incur additional license fees and potential transaction costs.  Many re-cre-
92 Cf. Kwikset Corp. v. Sup. Ct., 246 P.3d 877, 889 (Cal. 2011) (noting that “[t]o some
consumers, processes . . . matter,” and offering examples of conflict-free diamonds and
union-made goods); Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction
and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 526, 532 (2004) (“[C]onsumer
products—even when physically indistinguishable—are not perfect substitutes to the
extent that they are produced using different processes about which consumers have
strong feelings.”).
93 See DAVID SAX, THE REVENGE OF ANALOG: REAL THINGS AND WHY THEY MATTER 62
(2016) (“Film was a choice, and those who chose to use it . . . did so because they loved
something about the analog process and the look it produced.  Film photographers
wanted a more hands-on relationship with their material.”).
94 Id. at 63.
95 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
96 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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ations would not get made.  The upshot would be foregone re-creations with-
out much social payoff.
The next Part concludes the analysis by examining how such a path can
be found within current law.
III. IMPLEMENTING A PROCESS-SENSITIVE INFRINGEMENT TEST
In previous work, I have argued that the fair use doctrine enables U.S.
courts to discriminate between copy processes.97  When the defendant’s par-
ticular method of copying offers social benefits, a judge could weigh that
factor in its fair use analysis much the same way as judges already weigh the
social benefits of particular end products.  Still unanswered, however, is a
fundamental question: Is such sensitivity to process achievable within the
broader system of international copyright law, which constrains both the
United States as well as the vast majority of other countries?
The answer is yes.  The argument may seem an uphill climb given
Berne’s “in any manner” language in the definition of the reproduction
right.98  To suggest that not all methods of reproduction cash out the same
way in the final analysis appears to flout that requirement.  Were the thought
not so far-fetched, I might here weigh the possibility that Berne could be
amended.99
Yet such an amendment, however helpful in clarifying matters, should
not be strictly necessary.  Berne itself provides sufficient flexibility as is—one
simply needs to look for it.  The key is Article 9(2), commonly known as the
“Three-Step Test.”  That provision allows member states to permit otherwise-
infringing reproductions “[1] in certain special cases, provided that such
reproduction [2] does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work
and [3] does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
author.”100  Member states agreed to add this provision in 1971 as part of a
broad compromise over the inclusion of a reproduction right within Berne’s
requirements.101  The Three-Step Test both gives and takes away: it grants
states leeway to limit the scope of the reproduction right while simultane-
ously limiting the scope of those limitations.  Since its addition to Berne, it
has become a ubiquitous ingredient in international copyright lawmaking,
incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement,102 the World Intellectual Property
97 See Fishman, supra note 3, at 906.
98 Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 9(1).
99 See id. art. 9(2).
100 Id. (bracketed numbers added).
101 See MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST 47
(2004) (“The feasibility of the plan to attain the formal recognition of a general right of
reproduction . . . depended on whether or not the Conference would succeed in finding a
satisfactory formula for permissible limitations.”).
102 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 13.
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Organization Copyright Treaty (“WIPO Copyright Treaty”),103 and various
other copyright-related multilateral accords.104
Enough has been written on this provision to fill a small library, and
readers within the field may be understandably fatigued to find its invocation
here yet again.  My argument is in one sense radical but in another—and
perhaps less obvious—sense quite banal.  Since I presume that readers
haven’t read this far in search of banality, I’ll start with the former.  The test
has historically been used to authorize leniency toward certain purposes,
actors, or resulting products—not toward methods.  The critique practically
writes itself.  Surely the category of “normal exploitation” within the test’s
second step should include making permanent, near-exact, and public-facing
copies.  Moreover, how could the means of copying affect the “legitima[cy]”
of the owner’s interests under the third step, given the expansive grant of the
exclusive right to reproduce by “any manner” in the first instance?105
All of this is to say that the categories of “normal” and “legitimate” must
emerge from some normative theory.106  Some may balk at a set of first prin-
ciples that envisions copyright selecting not only among types of copies but
also among types of copying.  That move appears to distort the law’s histori-
cal form.  No less an authority than William Blackstone once wrote that copy-
right infringement occurs “whatever method be taken of exhibiting . . . [the
owner’s] composition to the ear or the eye of another, by recital, by writing,
or by printing, in any number of copies, or at any period of time,” simply
because “it is always the identical work of the author which is so exhib-
ited.”107  That doctrinal agnosticism regarding a defendant’s methods would
seem to fix courts’ focus squarely on end products.
The reality, however, is more complicated.  Copyright’s traditional form
is already sensitive to the defendant’s process, just in a way that we tend to
take for granted.  Unlike its patent law cousin, copyright has in fact never
103 See World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 10, Dec. 20,
1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 202 [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty].
104 See, e.g., Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances art. 13(2), June 24, 2012, 51
I.L.M. 1214; see also DANIEL J. GERVAIS, (RE)STRUCTURING COPYRIGHT: A COMPREHENSIVE
PATH TO INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT REFORM 62 (2017) (observing that, since its inclusion
in the TRIPS Agreement, the Three-Step Test has become “the cornerstone for almost all
limitations and exceptions to all intellectual property rights in international law”).
105 See Berne Convention, supra note 4, arts. 9(1), 9(2).
106 See Report of the Panel, United States–Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WTO Doc.
WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) (concluding that the term “legitimate” within the TRIPS
Agreement’s version of the test covered both “lawfulness from a legal positivist perspective”
as well as “legitimacy from a more normative perspective”); GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ,
supra note 26, at 378 (“The words ‘legitimate’ and ‘reasonable’ in the third step presuma-
bly inject normative meaning into the three-step test and, arguably, admit a variety of pub-
lic interests into the three-step equation.”).
107 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 305 (U. Chi. Press
1979) (1766).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL106.txt unknown Seq: 24  9-NOV-17 13:19
290 notre dame law review [vol. 93:1
concerned itself solely with end products.108  From its earliest years, copy-
right has distinguished between acts of copying and acts of independent crea-
tion.109  To find infringement, one must ask more than just whether the
defendant’s copy is too similar.  One must also inquire into what the defen-
dant did: copy, or come up with a similar work on her own?  Copyright, in
other words, is and always has been willing to find some practices honest and
others dishonest—even holding end products constant.
Once the law opens the door to sorting good processes (such as crea-
tion) from bad ones (such as copying), it is a natural extension to subdivide
the categories one step further by asking what means of copying the defen-
dant employed.  Indeed, some official commentary on Article 9(2) practically
invites such divisions.  The official guide to the Convention published by
WIPO explains that what counts as reasonable under the test’s third step may
change along with “arrival of new copying techniques” that increase the eco-
nomic impact of a given copy.110  It is always these newer—that is, cheaper—
techniques that cause the trouble.  The growing ubiquity of temporary digital
reproductions stored within computer memory became a flashpoint during
negotiations of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, ultimately preventing any
definitive statement from appearing in the main body text.111  In 2001, the
E.U. Information Society Directive highlighted the “increased economic
impact” that copyright exceptions and limitations may have in the digital
environment, noting that “the scope of certain exceptions or limitations may
have to be even more limited when it comes to certain new uses of copyright
works and other subject-matter.”112  As one leading commentator on the
Three-Step Test has explained, “[d]igital technology . . . alters copyright’s
balance because an improvement of copying techniques enhances the pos-
sibilities of taking advantage of exempted uses.”113
108 Because patent law lacks an independent invention defense, infringement can be
found based entirely on the resemblance between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s products.
See, e.g., Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
109 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:32 n.1 (2017) (discussing Roworth v.
Wilkes [1807] 170 Eng. Rep. 889, 890 (K.B.)).
110 WIPO Guide, supra note 30, at 56.
111 Instead, the contracting parties confined their interpretation of existing law to an
agreed statement. See World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Diplomatic Confer-
ence on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions: Agreed Statements Concerning the
WIPO Copyright Treaty, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/96 (Dec. 23, 1996) (“The reproduction
right, as set out in Article 9 of the Berne Convention, and the exceptions permitted there-
under, fully apply in the digital environment, in particular to the use of works in digital
form.”).  For more on the divisive negotiations, see Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital
Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 369, 382–92 (1997).
112 Information Society Directive, supra note 31, recital 44.
113 SENFTLEBEN, supra note 101, at 35 (footnote omitted); see also Guido Westkamp, The
“Three-Step Test” and Copyright Limitations in Europe: European Copyright Law Between Approxi-
mation and National Decision Making, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 5 (2008) (noting that
the test was a reaction to advancing “reprographic technology” and was meant to “prevent
the eradication of existing markets”).
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These regular consternations over digital advances underscore a basic
truth: copyright policy has always been sensitive to process.  Its modern devel-
opment at the international level has actually been chock-full of it.  We are
less inclined to think about laborious processes only because our law has usu-
ally been a one-way ratchet.  Lawmakers have been preoccupied with the easi-
est way.  And as the easiest gets even easier over time, more red flags go up
around uses that might have once seemed insignificant but could now
quickly balloon to industrial scale.
But if copyright is able to grow more restrictive in order to address easy
copying, it should equally be able to shrink those same restrictions in order
to address difficult copying.  However novel the proposal, tailoring liability
around the means of copying actually fits comfortably within the text of Arti-
cle 9(2).114  The “normal exploitation” requirement is meant to track the
owner’s actual and reasonably foreseeable markets of significant economic
importance.115  Most copyright owners do not expect much competition
from copies whose cost of production approaches the cost of making the
original.  Were it otherwise, the economic protection that copyright exclusiv-
ity provides would be unnecessary to begin with.  To be sure, there are excep-
tions, particularly within industries that rely on recreative performances.
Mounting a new production of a play, for example, might be an expensive
undertaking but is also a core part of the playwright’s expected market.  An
unlicensed new production of that play may very well fall within the owner’s
“normal exploitation” and, therefore, fail the Three-Step Test.  But for visual
and audiovisual media like photography, painting, sculpture, and film, recre-
ating the work from scratch is not an activity on which owners usually rely for
income and should not lie within their control.
A similar analysis applies to the “unreasonable prejudice” of owners’
“legitimate interests” under the third step.  Just as in trade secrecy law, there
is considerable play in the joints here for individual states to determine what
ought to constitute honest copying practices.116  As a general matter, this
114 There is a debate whether the three steps ought to be analyzed sequentially or holis-
tically, a question on which I remain agnostic here.  Whether much rides on the differ-
ence, in any event, is questionable. See Justin Hughes, Fair Use and Its Politics—At Home and
Abroad, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF EXCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 234, 242 (Ruth L.
Okediji ed., 2017) (“No matter how much prose a tribunal throws into keeping the second
and third steps analytically distinct, for practical purposes the second and third steps will
always (or almost always) overlap.”).
115 See, e.g., Report of the Panel, supra note 106, ¶ 6.180; RICKETSON, supra note 26, at
483 (“[T]he expression ‘normal exploitation of a work’ refers simply to the ways in which
an author might reasonably be expected to exploit his work in the normal course of
events. . . . [T]he determination of what is a normal exploitation will depend upon the
kind of work in question.”); SENFTLEBEN, supra note 101, at 193 (arguing that normal
exploitation is prejudiced only where “the authors are deprived of an actual or potential
market of considerable economic or practical importance”).
116 See RICKETSON, supra note 26, at 484 (commenting that “a flexible standard of rea-
sonableness to be ultimately determined by each national law appears as good a way as any”
to determine which prejudices are reasonable and which are not).
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step calls for a proportionality inquiry, balancing the magnitude of the
owner’s likely loss against the magnitude of others’ likely gains.117  The
defendant’s method of copying can easily affect that balance.  As the previous
Part argued, recreating a work by hand rather than digitally duplicating it
can reduce owners’ private costs while increasing both the copyist’s and audi-
ences’ benefits.  A given copy could fail the test if generated through one
process of copying while passing it generated through another.
Finally, an open-ended process filter can be confined to “certain special
cases” as the first step of the test requires.  This clause does not demand a
catalogue of every specific instance to be excepted.  Instead, it requires only
that the general scope of any exception be known and particularized, includ-
ing through judicial interpretation.118  Justin Hughes has recently character-
ized fair use as a Berne-compliant framework for judges to determine specific
exceptions, rather than a list of those exceptions themselves.119  Giving states
the leeway to consider process in their application of the Three-Step Test,
without specifying how that application should cash out in specific cases,
could function in much the same way.  Moreover, factor-based standards per-
colate through caselaw over time, eventually developing more certain bound-
aries as patterns emerge.120  As others have recognized, Article 10.2’s
requirement of “certain special cases” can accommodate dynamic systems
that gradually move from the abstract to the particular.121  Existing fair use
doctrine is one such system.  Process sensitivity would be another.
On this score, trade secrecy’s history of developing the concept of “hon-
est commercial practices” provides a good model for copyright.  It might not
117 See SENFTLEBEN, supra note 101, at 211 (“[T]he detriment to the authors must be
reasonably related to the benefit of the users. In other words, it must be proportionate.
The open terms ‘interest’, ‘legitimate’, and ‘unreasonable’ all point in this direction.”
(footnote omitted)); Christophe Geiger et al., The Three-Step Test Revisited: How to Use the
Test’s Flexibility in National Copyright Law, 29 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 581, 595 (2014) (describ-
ing the “several filters” present in this step, whereby “the legitimacy of the interests invoked
by the authors and right holders are to be weighed against the reasons justifying the use
privilege”).
118 See Report of the Panel, supra note 106, ¶ 6.108 (“[T]here is no need to identify
explicitly each and every possible situation to which the exception could apply, provided
that the scope of the exception is known and particularised.  This guarantees a sufficient
degree of legal certainty.”).
119 See Hughes, supra note 114, at 251–56.
120 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2541
(2009) (examining hundreds of fair use cases and finding that “fair use law is both more
coherent and more predictable than many commentators have perceived once one recog-
nizes that fair use cases tend to fall into common patterns”).  Samuelson further notes that
identifying such patterns “makes it easier to argue that fair use accommodates a number of
‘certain special cases.’” Id. at 2543–44 n.38.
121 See, e.g., Geiger et al., supra note 117, at 614 (“[O]pen factors such as those in the
U.S. fair use doctrine allow courts to determine ‘certain special cases’ of permissible unau-
thorized use in the light of the individual circumstances of a given case, just as must occur
to some degree in closed list systems.  With every court decision, a further ‘special case’
becomes known, particularized and thus ‘certain’ in the sense of the three-step test.”).
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have been clear in the doctrine’s primordial days that, say, reverse engineer-
ing would be a proper means of acquisition.  But as courts confronted similar
facts multiple times, that proposition came to be widely recognized nationally
and, eventually, internationally.  An honest copying practices exemption
within copyright could follow a similar trajectory.
Overall, there is no reason to treat a flexible process-based exemption
any differently than the flexible product- or purpose-based ones that exist
under current fair use systems.  I realize that, to some commentators, com-
parisons to U.S. fair use is a kiss of death.  Despite fair use law’s defenders,
there is doubt in some corners whether it complies with the Three-Step Test
to begin with.122  If you already share that doubt, nothing I have said in this
Article is likely to change your mind.123  But for everyone else who is not
ready to abandon fair use in the name of Berne, my argument is that sensitiv-
ity to process should not be abandoned either.
CONCLUSION
Copyright law would better serve the public interest if it became more
sensitive to the diversity of processes through which copies are made.  Stan-
dard copyright models assume cheap copying.  Those stereotypically cheap
processes deserve to remain within the owner’s control, exactly as they are
now, unless there is another good reason to exempt them.  But laborious re-
creation methods yield entirely different welfare effects that the standard
models fail to capture.  They often pose less risk, offer more spillovers in
teaching the technical skills of authorship, and offer a materially different
product to audiences.  These differences are obscured when infringement
liability treats all means of copying as equals.  A copyright system that could
distinguish between these different methods could produce more desirable
outcomes.
A comparative look at different jurisdictions’ copyright systems reveals
that this recognition is often bubbling close to the surface.  Nevertheless,
none of these systems has acknowledged the full policy significance of copy-
ing methods.  As a result, a distinction between methods tends to be applied,
if at all, only in limited areas such as private copying exceptions.  But the
payoff is more generalizable than has typically been recognized.
Trade secrecy learned this lesson long ago.  It does not merely gesture at
the differences between copying methods, as copyright does, but rather
makes those differences a key to liability.  Copyright lawmakers should start
paying attention.  Adopting an honest copying practices limitation would be
both wise as a normative matter and compatible with international copyright
122 See, e.g., Herman Cohen Jehoram, Restrictions on Copyright and Their Abuse, 27 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 359 (2005).
123 That attempt has already been ably made by Geiger et al., supra note 117, and by
Hughes, supra note 114.
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law as a descriptive matter.  While trade secrecy doesn’t get much airtime in
copyright policy discussions, on this issue it deserves more of it.  Sensitivity to
defendants’ various processes is a practice worth copying.
